The Four-Year Myth and How it Relates to Andrew Bayly Appalling Behavior

More time in office won’t lead to better policies—just slower processes or more poorly thought-out ones. And without real accountability, it just gives politicians more time to avoid consequences.

A four-year term won’t fix what’s broken in New Zealand politics. It’s a superficial reform, a low-hanging fruit that sounds like a real solution but completely ignores the core issue: accountability. I know that’s a common argument against the four-year term, but I don’t think supporters of a four-year term fully grasp just how bad our accountability structures already are.

The case for a longer term is simple: give governments more time to implement policies without constantly worrying about re-election, which should lead to better policy, right? I seriously doubt this.

The idea is that without the pressure of short election cycles, politicians can focus on governing, not campaigning. Sounds good in theory. But here’s the problem—government inefficiency has nothing to do with term length. It has everything to do with the fact that political institutions are slow by design, and those in power are rarely held accountable in any meaningful way. If we needed proof of how easy it is for politicians to evade real consequences, we only have to look at Andrew Bayly.

Bayly, a senior National MP, physically intimidated a staffer—and instead of being fired, he was allowed to quietly resign. That wasn’t just weak leadership from Christopher Luxon—it was a blatant failure of political accountability. If a minister can behave like that, walk away on his own terms, and face no real consequences, what does that say about how we hold political power to account?

This is why I don’t buy the argument that a four-year term will improve governance. It won’t make government more effective—it will just give politicians more time to move slowly, push through more poorly executed policies, but not necessarily improve the quality of their decisions. More time doesn’t mean better, it means either slower or more. Extending their term doesn’t fix inefficiency; it just stretches out the same flawed processes over a longer period.

If we can’t even fire a minister for serious misconduct, why should we trust politicians with an extra year in office before we get to vote them out? The system already protects those in power, and making their terms longer just means delaying the only real accountability mechanism we have—elections.

Photo by Brett Jordan on Unsplash

If anyone thinks accountability in government isn’t a major issue, or that we already have effective mechanisms in place, just look at the Francis Report (2019) on bullying in Parliament and Judith Collins’ recent letter on due process. The Francis Report exposed a deeply entrenched culture of bullying and harassment in Parliament, where power imbalances and weak complaint processes allowed bad behavior to go unchecked. Meanwhile, Collins’ letter raises a different but related concern: how skipping or short cutting due parliamentary process for policymaking leads to bad law. Together, these two documents highlight the same fundamental issue—our political institutions struggle to be held accountable once in power. So yes, I struggle to support a move to give them more time in power before we can go and vote them in or out.

We don’t need to give politicians more time in power—we need to demand better systems that actually hold them accountable to be more effective within the time they have.

The Four-Year Term Bill: A Confusing Half-Step

The Four-Year Term Bill being pushed by the current government is being framed as a way to improve lawmaking and governance in New Zealand. The argument is that a three-year term is too short, forcing governments to rush policies without enough time to develop and implement them properly. The bill proposes a system where Parliament would still have a standard three-year term but could extend it to four years under certain conditions. Already confusing.

According to the proposal, a government could extend its term to four years if select committees meet a “proportionality requirement.” In theory, this is meant to act as a safeguard—ensuring that non-executive members (MPs who are not ministers) hold a majority in select committees, which are supposed to act as a check on the government. But in practice, this does little to address the real issue of accountability.

The decision to extend the term would be made through a Proclamation issued by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. That alone raises red flags about the potential for executive overreach. The bill also proposes entrenching the ability to extend the term, meaning any future attempt to repeal or amend this mechanism would require either a 75% majority in Parliament or a nationwide referendum, both problematic approaches. That’s an extremely high bar—higher than what’s required for most policy changes that directly affect New Zealanders.

At its core, this bill is based on the flawed assumption that government inefficiency is caused by election cycles. It isn’t. Governments aren’t slow because they only have three years. They are slow because political institutions are designed to be deliberate, bureaucratic, and resistant to rapid change. That’s not necessarily a bad thing—stability is important. But extending the term doesn’t fix inefficiency, it just gives politicians more time to operate within the same flawed system.

If we’re going to claim that government needs more time to develop “well-tested policy and legislation,” we should also be asking: who is actually being held accountable when bad policies get pushed through?

Even supporters of the bill acknowledge its risks. Legal expert Andrew Geddis pointed out that while a longer term gives governments more time to implement policies, it also reduces how often they’re held accountable. As he put it, “Elections are pretty much the only way we have to keep our government accountable.” Former Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Palmer went further, warning that a four-year term could create legislative gridlock rather than improving efficiency.

Andrew Bayly’s Resignation: A Case Study in Weak Accountability

Andrew Bayly’s resignation is a textbook example of why New Zealand’s accountability mechanisms for those in power are weak—and why extending political terms is a mistake.

Bayly, a senior National MP and former minister, resigned in February after admitting to grabbing a staff member’s arm during a heated argument. This was his second misconduct incident in just five months. But instead of facing real consequences, he was allowed to resign on his own terms.

Prime Minister Christopher Luxon found out about the incident on a Thursday. By Friday, Bayly had already decided to resign, and the public didn’t hear about it until the following Monday, after he had time to inform his family and staff.

This isn’t just about Bayly’s actions—it’s about how the system handled them. Luxon letting him resign instead of firing him wasn’t leadership; it was political damage control, and it was irresponsable. If a sitting minister can physically intimidate a staffer, leave office on his own terms, and walk away with his dignity intact, it shows exactly how little accountability actually exists for those in power.

Headshot of Andrew Bayly

The Francis Report (2019) laid bare this exact problem. The review found that Parliament tolerates bullying and harassment, that power imbalances allow bad behavior to go unchecked, and that those who speak out often face repercussions while those responsible are shielded​. As one staffer quoted in the report put it, “The emotional and financial freight is being paid by staff, not the Member”​. Another respondent noted that MPs are well aware of who the repeat offenders are, but there’s a “conspiracy of silence” around their behavior​.

This is why I don’t buy the idea that a four-year term will improve governance. Our problem isn’t that we vote too often—it’s that our political system already protects those in power and allows them to avoid real consequences. Extending their term length just means the public has to wait even longer to hold them accountable. If we’re serious about making government more effective, we need to strengthen accountability first. The Bayly case, just like the findings of the Francis Report, shows that the structures meant to keep politicians in check aren’t working. Until that changes, giving them more time in office is just giving them more time to dodge consequences.

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The assumption behind the four-year term argument is that governments would be more effective if they had more time. But longer terms don’t change the nature of political institutions.

I’ve lived in countries with longer terms, including Mexico (six years) and the U.S. (four years). They have the same inefficiencies, and then some. Term length isn’t the issue—the nature of political institutions is. The system is slow because it was built to be slow. Rushing policy can lead to disastrous outcomes, and having too much unchecked power can do the same.

If politicians want to make government more efficient, they should focus on fixing accountability, not extending their own time in office.

A four-year term isn’t the reform New Zealand needs. If we actually want better governance, we should be demanding stronger accountability measures. Bayly shouldn’t have been allowed to resign—he should have been fired. If even elected officials can dodge real consequences, imagine how much worse the problem is in the bureaucratic layers of government.

We should also be pushing for more transparency, stronger whistleblower protections, and real consequences for misconduct. If the goal is to improve government, we should focus on mechanisms that empower the public—not just give politicians more time before they have to answer to us.

I’ll be putting in a submission against the four-year term. And I remain disgusted that Andrew Bayly was allowed to resign instead of being fired.

So what do you think? Would a four-year term actually improve NZ politics—or is it just a convenient excuse for politicians to delay accountability?

⬇️ Drop your thoughts in the comments.